


F.O.
371

S
34

CLOSED
UNTIL
1992

159143



See JS 1062
(1961)

1961

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

V

S 1821/1.

FROM Sir R. Parkes,
Khartoum.

SUBJECT:

Sudanese refugees.

William DENG is believed to have crossed
into Kenya; Note from Sudanese Ministry dated
February 28.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 188.

Dated March 3.

Received March 4.

References
JS 1062/18

J 23/2

MINUTES

Copy to Mr K. Woodruff, C.O.
together with a copy of Khartoum Tel. 174 (which is
attached)

Runc

6/3

(Printing Instructions)

159143

(Outward Action)

8/3/61. Woodruff, C.O. May

(Tel) Khartoum 291, 20/3.

cf. K. Woodruff, C.O. 22/3.
Mr Hull, C.O. 7/3.

(Action
completed)

JS 8

7.3.61.

(Main Indexed)

all
9/11/62

-14.

M. Index

V

CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

4 MAR 1961

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Parkes

No. 188

March 3, 1961

D. 11.16 a.m. March 3, 1961

R. 1.40 p.m. March 3, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 188 of March 3.
Repeated for information to Governor Kenya and Governor Uganda

My telegram No. 26 to Entebbe: William Deng.

Note dated February 28 from the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs us officially that Deng is believed to have crossed into Kenya and asks us to approach the Government of Kenya to arrange for his return. Text by bag.

2. I have acknowledged the Note adding the Government of Kenya are being informed of the Sudan Government's wish.

Foreign Office pass Nairobi 9 and Entebbe 27.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section C.O. for repetition to Nairobi and Entebbe]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

North and East African Department
West and Central African Department
United Nations Department
Information Policy Department
Information Research Department

F F F F

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry
No. VS 1821

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Open

AJMC
JGSB
20/3

Draft.

~~Saving~~ Telegram to:—

KHARTOUM

No. 291

(Date) 20/3

And to:—

~~Saving, confidential and personal~~

Repeat to:—

Nairobi

Entebbe

Gov. Uganda

Gov. Kenya

En Clair.

~~Cypher~~

Cypher

Flag A

Distribution:—

Departmental

NEAD

WCAD

I.P.D.

News Dept.

Copies to:— Flag B

Mr. K. Woolverton, C.O.

Mr. Hull, C.O.

C.O.

Cleaned with Mr
Woolverton, C.O.
by telephone
20/3

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)

(Date) 21 March 61

Despatched 7.55 pm

EMERGENCY
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
with priority
without priority
DEFERRED

CONFIDENTIAL

[Security classification
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Address to KHARTOUM

telegram No. 291 (date) 20/3

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
21 MAR 1961

~~Saving, confidential and personal~~
repeated for information to Nairobi, Entebbe
Governor Uganda,
Governor Kenya

Your tel. No. 188 of March 3: Sudanese
refugees in Uganda.

You will see from my despatch about
my talks with General Hassan Beshire that
he raised this question. Sayed Mahomed
Osman Yassein, P.U.S. in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, also discussed it when
he called on the Department on March 16.

2. We recalled to him your approach of
February 18 (your tel. No. 148) about the
public criticism which the forcible
return of these men would evoke and the
reminder in your Note of March 3. We asked
whether General Hassan's approach was to
be regarded as, in effect, the answer to
your enquiry. Sayed Mahomed said the
answer was surely obvious. The presence
of the refugees in Uganda was in his view
a greater danger to Anglo-Sudanese
relations than any likely ~~publicity~~ criticism. We
reminded him that such criticism
stressed that the publicity could

the

could

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

to both Govts.

be embarrassing. There had already been two Questions in the House of Commons; there might well be more and the newspapers might also work up a campaign. Sayed Mahomed ^{insisted} remained firm; he hoped that the return of the men could be arranged administratively: could they not be taken to the border and given a push? We explained that this was not possible under Uganda Legislation (as you know, either the Director of Refugees or the Courts have to be satisfied that there will be no victimization) and added that the best solution would be to get the men to return voluntarily. Could any inducements be offered?

3. Sayed Mahomed said he would certainly look into this. He imagined we had in mind the possibility, for example, of providing them with jobs; he recognised, too, that these men must have some grievances - they would not have run away without cause. This could also be examined.

4. Please press the above suggestion on the Permanent Under-Secretary when he returns to Khartoum. We should like the Sudanese Govt. to take urgent action in this sense, ~~because it is not our object to postpone a decision indefinitely.~~ ~~W~~ We think it is up to them to try to get the men back by persuasion, since their expulsion into Sudanese territory will probably lay both H.M.G. and the Sudanese Government open to criticism; we should be accused of refusing normal political asylum and the Sudanese of trying to bully the victims of their Islamisation policy. /5.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(70614) Hw.

Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

5. For your ~~xxx~~ information, should an attempt by the Sudanese on the above lines fail, we should probably wish then to arrange for the return of the men as quickly as possible, provided always we received adequate guarantees against victimisation.

Qme

20/3

Distrubuted to.

NEAD

WCAD

Information Policy Dept-

News Dept-

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO KHARTOUM

Cypher/OTP and
By Bag
VS 1821

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 291
March 20, 1961

D: 7.55 p.m. March 20, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Khartoum telegram No. 291 of March 20
Repeated for information Saving, Confidential and Personal
to: Governor Uganda
Governor Kenya

Your telegram No. 188 [of March 3: Sudanese refugees in Uganda]

You will see from my despatch about my talk with General Hassan Beshir that he raised this question. Sayed Mahomed Osman Yassein, Permanent Under Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also discussed it when he called on the Department on March 16.

2. We recalled to him your approach of February 18 (your telegram No. 148) about the public criticism which the forcible return of these men would evoke and the reminder in your Note of March 3. We asked whether General Hassan's approach was to be regarded as, in effect, the answer to your enquiry. Sayed Mahomed said the answer was surely obvious. The presence of the refugees in Uganda was in his view a greater danger to Anglo-Sudanese relations than any likely criticism. We reminded him that such criticism could be embarrassing to both Governments. There had already been two Questions in the House of Commons; there might well be more and the newspapers might also work up a campaign. Sayed Mahomed insisted that the return of the men could be arranged administratively: could they not be taken to the border and given a push? We explained that this was not possible under Uganda Legislation (as you know, either the Director of Refugees or the Courts have to be satisfied that there will be no victimization) and added that the best solution would be to get the men to return voluntarily. Could any inducements be offered?

/ 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office telegram No. 291 to Khartoum

- 2 -

3. Sayed Mahomed said he would certainly look into this. He imagined we had in mind the possibility, for example, of providing them with jobs; he recognized, too, that these men must have some grievances - they would not have run away without cause. This could also be examined.

4. Please press the above suggestion on the Permanent Under-Secretary when he returns to Khartoum. We should like the Sudanese Government to take urgent action in this sense. We think it is up to them to try to get the men back by persuasion, since their expulsion into Sudanese territory will probably lay both Her Majesty's Government and the Sudanese Government open to criticism; we should be accused of refusing normal political asylum and the Sudanese of trying to bully the victims of their Islamisation policy.

5. For your information, should an attempt by the Sudanese on the above lines fail, we should probably wish then to arrange for the return of the men as quickly as possible, provided always we received adequate guarantees against victimisation.

DISTRIBUTED TO:-

N.E.A.D.

W.C.A.D.

Information Policy Department

News Department

CCC

CONFIDENTIAL

1961

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

V S1821/2.

FROM Colonial Office
(comm'd)

SECRET

No. EAF 430/671/02

Dated February 21.

Received March 6.

SUBJECT:

Sudanese Refugees in the West Nile District, Uganda
Visiting Sudanese have been trying to contact them.

References

MINUTES

Amc
7/3

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action
completed)

(Main Indexed)

Agley
4/3/62

ad
4/14/62

A.J. T. Gail Esq. to



Enter

With the compliments of

Mr Woodhouse

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES

6 MAR 1961

V51821/2.

COLONIAL OFFICE

GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.1

ENF 430/611/02

8. 3. 61.

1961

V

North and East African Department

V S 1821/3.

SUDAN

FROM *Colonial Office.*
(communicated).

SUBJECT:

SECRET

Sudanese Refugees.

Uganda will accept WILLIAM DENG - AGGREY
JADEW

No. *Uganda 168.*

Dated *March 2.*

Received *March 6.*

References

-11

MINUTES

Done
7/3

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action
completed)

Adley
2/26/61

(Main Indexed)

ad
9/11/62

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

BB.F
VS



FROM UGANDA (Governor's Deputy)

Cypher (O.T.P.)

D. 2nd March, 1961.

R. 2nd " " 19.55 hours.

SECRET
No.168

Following telegram No.2088 addressed to Ambassador Khartoum, repeated to Foreign Office (S. of S. please pass to both) Governor Kenya.

Begins.

Your telegram No.26.

Sudanese Refugee - William Deng.

I am now prepared to accept Deng and have so informed Kenya.

2. Reference A.D.C. Malakal, details are as follows.

Name Aggrey Jaden.

Tribe Fajulu.

From Yei

Became A.D.C. 1954 and dismissed late 1959, since when he has been living in Juba.

Ends.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for retransmission to Khartoum.)

Copy sent to:-

Foreign Office - Staff Officer

SECRET

1961

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

V S 1821/4.

FROM *Blancery, Khartoum.*

SUBJECT :

*Note no. 61 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the
Sudanese wish that a MR. WILLIAM DENG should
be returned to the Sudan from Kenya.*

No. *1591.*

Dated *March 3.*

Received *March 7.*

References

1.

MINUTES

Copy to Mr K. Woolverton, C.O.

*Done
8/3*

1) Kenya to C.O. 260, 15/3.

(Printing Instructions)

*Wys
22/3*

(Outward Action)

del) K. Woolverton, C.O. 9/3.

(Action
completed)

9/3/67

(Main Indexed)

9/11/67



RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES

- 7 MAR 1961

VS 1821/4.

1591

Unclassified.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF THE
CHANCERY

Reference: Khartoum Tel.
188 dated 3.3.61

VS 1821/1

BRITISH EMBASSY,
KHARTOUM,
SUDAN.

3.3.61

(1591)

Note No. 61.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan and have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Ministry's Note MFA/SCR/41.F., of the 28th of February.

The Embassy note the Ministry's wish that Mr. William Deng should be returned to the Sudan and are so informing the Government of Kenya. In this connexion the Embassy wish to recall the discussion which took place on the 7th of February between His Excellency the Ambassador and the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry, with regard to the six Sudanese nationals who have crossed into Uganda.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of their highest consideration.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
KHARTOUM.

March 3, 1961.

COPY

MFA/SCR/41.F.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Khartoum and has the honour to state that the Equatorian Authorities have discovered the absence of Mr. William Deng and it is believed that he has crossed into Kenya.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would highly appreciate it if Her Majesty's Embassy would extend their customary cooperation and approach the Government of Kenya to arrange for his return.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan avails itself of this opportunity to renew to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

Khartoum, 28th February 1961

To:
Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,
Khartoum.

A.J.R. Craig Ro.



Letter

With the compliments of

Mr. Woolverton.

COLONIAL OFFICE

GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.1

BAF 430/671/02

17.3.61

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

FROM KENYA (Sir P. Renison)

Cypher (O.T.P.)

D. 15th March, 1961.

R. 15th " " 14.20 hrs.



SECRET

No. 260.

Addressed to S. of S.

Repeated to Governor's Deputy, Uganda

" " Ambassador, Khartoum,

No. 148.

(S. of S. please pass to Khartoum.)

William Deng.

Uganda telegram No. 191 refers.

Deng handed revolver, property of Sudan Government to District Commissioner, Kitale, telling him he only took it for protection on journey. It is now at Lodwar and will be handed to Sudan authorities next time liaison meeting occurs. No information regarding files.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for repetition to Khartoum.)

SECRET

1961

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

VS 1821/5

FROM Kenya to C.O.
(commnd.)

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 450 (Savings)

Dated Feb. 22

Received March 10

SUBJECT: Sudanese Refugee - WILLIAM DENG.
Encloses a copy of Deng's statement, given at Lodwar: intentions; details of funds and size of family.

1821

References

MINUTES

Mmm!

Mr Deng wants to settle his family with friends in Uganda and go on himself to France. He has £250 which won't get him very far.

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

I don't think this calls for any action now. The Governor won't let him out of Uganda. But really there seems little future for these men outside the Sudan. They would surely do better to make their peace with the Govt and go back. It is not as if there were in the main a stream of African nationalism and could hope to find from its various sponsors.

Amending

17/5

J136 58267-3

The second para on page 2 would

not

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

Alah
23/5/61

WJ
9/6/62

not so if Deng and good if the business read it.
But it also makes it difficult for us to handle him.

with 10/2

1/2
May 21

Number of copies.....

Number of copies
of enclosures.....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

A J. M. Craig

Bo



P/4 pp

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES

With the compliments of 10 MAR 1961

Mr Wootton

V/S1821/5.

COLONIAL OFFICE

GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.1

ENF 430(671102

9.3.61

EAF

SAVING

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Officer Administering the Government of Kenya

To: The Secretary of State for the Colonies. ✓

Date: 22 February, 1961. British Embassy, Khartoum, Sudan.

No. 450/61 Saving Officer Administering the Government of Uganda, Entebbe.

SUDANESE REFUGEE - WILLIAM DENG.

JSI 062/13

JSI 062/18

My telegrams 121 and 171 refer.

2. I attach a copy of Deng's statement, given at Lodwar, where he arrived en route for Uganda.


GHW/EMC

GOVERNOR.

Ministry of Defence,
NAIROBI.

(XAF.22/28 /ol(s))

CONFIDENTIAL



LODWAR, KENYA.

5th February, 1961.

I have been asked by the Kenya Government to give a full statement of:-

1. My intention and desire for seeking political asylum in Uganda.
2. Details of funds in my possession at the present time.
3. Size and nature of my family.

Although I am aware that the Governments of East Africa have a fair knowledge of conditions in the Southern Sudan, past and present, I have a strong temptation to give an outline of events leading to my resignation as Assistant District Commissioner and seeking the political asylum.

Since the signing of the Cairo Agreement of 1953 between the British and Egyptian Governments with the consent of the Northern Arabs, providing for self Government, political plight in the South had worsen. The Southerners felt unprepared and did not want the British Government to go away; this view was shared by many British officials some of whom I knew in the South but the British Government was overshadowed by other considerations and the South found itself thrown to the wolves. At that time the South was represented by the Southern Liberal Party which was divided into two groups, one favouring complete separation from the North, which was actually the view of most Southerners, and another, a moderate group favoured federation between North and South as a compromise having seen such powerful countries like the United States of America, Canada, Australia etc. At that time there was a Governor General's Commission which contained an Egyptian. By money and false propaganda the Egyptians echoed the lies of their Arab brother in the North and the South was promised a false hope that federation would be given with ease. When Ismail El Azahari, a stocky, bull-necked figure with the appearance of a myopic gorilla came to power as first Prime Minister with a clear and corrupted majority, he forgot about the promise he made to the South and told the Southerners that the British will soon have left the country, he would rule with iron hand because he had the armed forces at his disposal. The British Government unlike the Arab remained faithful to the Agreement at the time they still had the power to cancel it. El Azahari gave instructions to the Northern Administrators in the South to tyrannise the area because he thought this was the way to deal with slaves who should not be given the chance to destroy the Independence. Tension grew steadily and the result was the tragic Revolution of 1955 in which Southern Troops and people took part. 500 Northerners were killed and probably twice as many from the Southerners lost their lives when the Northerners came to revenge. This revolution was the true expression for the dislike of Arabs and it failed because it was not properly organised and received no backing from Uganda. El Azahari kissed the hand of the Governor General to put down the Mutiny For him. The kissing had no meaning but simply a deception of the Arabs to which the British Government fell victim over the Suez Canal and the Southern Sudan.

El Azahari was however defeated after the Revolution but much damage was done. A move for separation grew stronger but a new party namely the Umma which came to power made fresh promises for federation once the British left the country finally. The federation issue was to be considered by a Constituent Assembly which would decide the permanent constitution for the country. Again the Arabs could not agree and they directly or by implicitly handed over the Government to a Military junta which trained only

in musketry. The Arabs believed that the Unity of the Sudan can only be achieved by force, though they have now begun to be uneasy about wild dictatorship to which the whole country is subjected. The part worse hit is the South, because there is no simple Southern officer in the Army Council. The Army clique has decided to absorb the South by all kinds of tyrannical methods which has made that part of the country a huge prison. C.I.D. Police in uniforms as well as plain clothes are everywhere. When the oppressed murmur any discontent he finds himself in prison. 10 years has become a normal sentence. Christianity and christian civilisation are ruthlessly attacked and the educated Southerners who are at present the leaders of the South are branded "Mission-educated" who cannot be trusted. White and native missionaries are being persecuted, and many from the former group have been expelled from the South. Those remaining are not allowed to leave their Mission compounds and therefore rendered idle at the time the South is badly in need of their spiritual services. As an example a native priest who allowed his type-writer to be used by Secondary school boys who were protesting against the change of Sunday holidays to Fridays was sentenced to 12 years hard labour and the boys 10 years each. The Arabs say that the slaves does not want to be educated and therefore the prison should be his home. Chiefs and others are being made Muslims by black-mail and the Government has decided to finance Islam in the South in the hope that political problems will be solved when the South has turned Muslim. This is of course a dishonest or deliberate misconception of facts. The South has nothing in common with the North and Southern Muslims and christians are at one in their views. Even the sons of the ex-slaves who are living in Omdurman and who have 100% Arab culture look to the South with great sympathy. Many of the separatist political leaders in the South are Muslim. The Southerners therefore feel like fish out of water under this savage colonisation. The Street shoes cleaner of Omdurman have been dressed in uniform and sent to the South as soldiers or policeman to terrorise the people. Most Southern officials have been transferred North even without any knowledge of Arabic so that the Arabs can do anything they like without being witnessed by too many intelligent Southerners. I was lucky to remain in the South for 5 years of my service to witness the tragedy that has befallen my people. Ex-politicians are virtually prisoners in their own homes if they have not been convicted. A member from my own constituency is now serving a 10 years sentence in the North.

Many educated Southerners therefore started to think out behind closed doors of what to do under these difficult circumstances. Some of these men are now in Uganda where they have been granted political asylum. I was one of them and remained behind only to find a better chance for escape. My intention in seeking political asylum in East Africa is to study conditions there with the view of becoming a member for a new Southern party which will liberate the South and link it either with Uganda or the proposed Federation of East and Central Africa. This is now the wish of the four million Southerners, inhabiting over $\frac{1}{3}$ of a million square miles of land, and the problem is how to achieve this aim. I am one of those who have set out to find how to solve the problem. I am convinced that without the co-operation of all African countries specially those bordering the Southern Sudan, and of Western European powers, particularly the Commonwealth and the French community, our aim cannot be successful. We feel 100% African and we want to join our African brothers and sisters in enjoying the dignity and worth of human beings. We in the South believe in christian civilisation which has preserved the world for centuries and absorbed slavery. We have nothing in common with the Northern Arabs except a history

full of bloodshed and animosity. The Arabs do not want us but they only want to exploit our economic potential. The sooner we separate, the better for us and for them too. Egypt is behind the scene because it wants an empire along the Nile Valley where it could dictate terms in connection with the Nile waters. Egypt does not want any independent powerful African country along the Nile and this explains the reason for the subversive activities directed by Egypt against the Governments of East Africa who are merely preparing Africans for independence. Egypt finds the North a fertile ground for its false propaganda because of common race and cultural back-ground. The soil is not so fertile for them in the South and one would hope, in the rest of Africa. It is my intention to make this point clear to our African brothers when time is opportune. "Pan Africanism" which includes the Arabs means little to us in the South. European colonialism has now changed meaning specially with the British and the French; it has become one of preparing dependent peoples for independence. What we in the South are more worried about is the new and savage colonisation of the Arabs with all their relatives and backward culture.

I should like to mention here that my stay in East Africa will only be temporary. I shall be proceeding to France once I have settled my family with my friends in Uganda. If I have been too frank, I am always ready to accept advice.

I am at present in possession of two hundred and fifty Sudanese pounds.

I have a wife, two sons of two and three and half years respectively, and a daughter aged four months.

WILLIAM DENG.

1961

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

VS 1821/6.

FROM Chancery, Cairo,
F.W.E. African Dept.

SUBJECT:

Sudanese Refugees in Uganda.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1023/61.

Dated March, 10.

Received March, 15.

Reaction in the Cairo press.

1821

References

MINUTES

Copy (3 copies) to Mr Woolverton, C.O.
and to Chancery Khartoum.
Done
16/3

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

cdy Mr Woolverton, C.O.
(3 copies) 17/3
Chancery, Khartoum.

(Action
completed)

(Main Indexed)

14/3/61

9/11/62


CONFIDENTIAL

1023/61



BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,
CAIRO.

March 10, 1961.



Dear Department,

Please refer to Guidance telegram No. 40 of January 27 and the question of Sudanese refugees in Uganda. Up till now we have not had any approaches on this subject, nor have there been any discussions in the press. On March 6, however, Rose-el-Yusuf came out with a short article entitled "Plot in the Sudan - will a free South government be constituted?" which charged missionaries and doctors in the Southern Sudan, mainly Britishers and Belgians, with conspiring to establish an independent republic there, or at best to create a federal union between Southern and Northern Sudan. The main aim of the conspiracy is said to be to encourage the escape of the intellectuals in the South and give them asylum in the neighbouring British Colonies. Eight persons are alleged to have fled from the Southern Sudan this year, the last being a Mr. William Ding, a high official acting as Assistant General Commissioner in the South, who sought asylum in Kenya during an inspection tour he was undertaking on the border.

2. The brunt of the accusations rests on the British, since Rose-el-Yusuf made a point of reporting that all those who sought refuge in Kenya had been educated in mission schools in the Southern Sudan, and have great influence on the tribes living on the Kenya and Uganda borders.

3. We will keep you informed of any further repercussions in the press, and enclose four extra copies of this letter for you to pass if you wish to the Commonwealth Relations Office.

Yours ever,

Chancery

Q.

North and East Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

V S 1821/7

1961

FROM Air R. Parkes
Khartoum

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 255.
Dated March, 23.
Received March, 24.

SUBJECT:

Sudanese refugees in Uganda.
The Sudanese Minister for Foreign Affairs
agrees that peaceful persuasion to return
is the best course open, and that
publicity should be avoided.

References

VS 1821/1.

MINUTES

Copy to Mr Woolverton and Mr Hull, C.O.

This is good as far as it goes, but
it is not clear how far that is. D.H.

Amending

30B

30
5

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

Off Mr Breuchley, Khartoum,
from Mr Smith. 1/4
cc) Mr Woolverton, C.O. 4/4.

(Action
completed)

5/4/61

(Main Indexed)

ad
9/11/62

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Parkes ARCH

No. 255

March 23, 1961

RECEIVED

ARCH

24 MAR 1961

VS 1821/7

D. 5.54 p.m. March 23, 1961

R. 6.12 p.m. March 23, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 255 of March 23.
Repeated for information Saving to Governor Uganda

" Kenya

VS 1821/1

Your telegram No. 291: Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

I mentioned the discussions in London with Hassan Beshir and Mohammed Osman Yassein on the above subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on March 23. He had so far received no report of their result, but when I spoke in terms of paragraph 4 of your telegram under reference said he fully agreed that peaceful persuasion to return would be the best course. In his personal opinion undue publicity should be avoided at all costs.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Governors Uganda and Kenya, as my telegrams Nos. 4 and 12.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section C.O. for repetition Saving to Uganda and Kenya.]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

N.E.A.D.

W.C.A.D.

Information Policy Department

News Department



HHH

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

VS 18217

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

K

T.F.

Brenchley

Esq

Khanthun

from

H.F. Smith

Your telegram no. 255 of
March 23 about the Sudanese
refugees in Uganda was
encouraging. But the Foreign
Minister seems to have given
no indication of what he
proposed to do about following
up the idea of peaceful
persuasion.

2. Was it clear that he
was going to look into ways
and means? Or will progress
have to wait for the return of
Mahomed Osman Yassin (whom,
by the way, we did not
altogether take to)?

Copy to

4/4

K. W. W. W. W.

Co.

AS 30
3

CONFIDENTIAL

(VS 1821/7)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

April 1, 1961.

Your telegram No. 255 of March 23 about the Sudanese refugees in Uganda was encouraging. But the Foreign Minister seems to have given no indication of what he proposed to do about following up the idea of peaceful persuasion.

2. Was it clear that he was going to look into ways and means? Or will progress have to wait for the return of Mahomed Osman Yassein (whom, by the way, we did not altogether take to)?

(H. F. T. Smith.)

T. F. Brenchley, Esq.,
Khartoum.

CONFIDENTIAL

V

North and East African Department

VS. 1821/8.

1961

SUDAN

FROM C.O. (commid)

SECRET

No. 319 (S)
Dated March, 22
Received March, 30.

SUBJECT :

Indonesian Refugee - WILLIAM DENG.
Allegation that Deng absconded with Sudan
Government property.
Encloses a statement by the C.I.D., Kampala.
1821 (Tel. No 319 (Saring) from Uganda to the C.O.)

References

MINUTES

Done
7/4

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action
completed)

(Main Indexed)

Done
7/4/62

ed
9/11/62

A.J. D. Camp

60

Enter



RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES

With the compliments of

30 MAR 1961

Mr. Woodward

VS 1624/8

COLONIAL OFFICE

GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.1

BAF 430 1671102

SECRET

Uganda Reference: S.8306

DUPLICATE

SAVING

From THE GOVERNOR OF UGANDA.

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

Date 22nd March, 1961

No. 319 Saving.

RECEIVED
28 MAR 1961
COLONIAL OFFICE

SUDANESE REFUGEE: WILLIAM DENG

Please refer to my Cypher Telegram No. 191 addressed to you, and copied to the Ambassador, Khartoum and the Governor of Kenya as No. 2102.

2. Our C.I.D. have now investigated the allegation that Deng absconded with Sudanese Government property, and I enclose for your information a copy of their report.

3. In this connection I should point out that I have had no formal approach from the Sudanese Consul General on this subject, whose reaction so far has been limited to a verbal complaint alleging this theft to the Commissioner of Police.

GOVERNOR.

Copied to:

The British Ambassador, ✓
Khartoum.

The Governor of Kenya.

SECRET

SECRET

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT,
POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
KAMPALA, UGANDA.

14th March, 1961.

Subject: WILLIAM DENG, alleged
fugitive offender.

Reference to Papers: F/9/61/3

Senior Superintendent, Central Office.

With reference to the allegation that WILLIAM DENG, who arrived in Uganda from the Sudan in February, 1961, seeking political asylum, brought with him a revolver, a refrigerator and three secret files, belonging to the Sudanese Government:

2. On 10th March, 1961, I interviewed William Deng, 32, a Dinka and a former Assistant District Commissioner of Kapoeta District, Equatoria Province, South Sudan. He says that he left the Sudan on 1st February 1961, to seek political asylum in Uganda. He entered Uganda at Amudat having travelled via Lodwar in Kenya. He was accompanied by his wife and three children and carried with him a .38 revolver and eleven rounds of .38 ammunition for their protection. This revolver was the property of the Sudanese Government. He says he took it over from his predecessor as A.D.C., Kapoeta. He also carried a 12 bore shot gun and a 10.75 calibre rifle which are his own property but for which he had no ammunition. He surrendered all these firearms on arrival at Amudat. Deng was later instructed to return to Kenya and the firearms were sent to Kitale, where on 13th February 1961, Deng was issued with a receipt (No.54619) for them by the Kitale Police. I have examined this receipt. He says he also brought with him a refrigerator which was his own property. He says he bought his refrigerator for £100 in November or December 1960 from a Mr. HILL, District Commissioner, Lodwar, Kenya, paid for it with his own money and imported it into the Sudan, paying £30 customs duty. He produced correspondence between Mr. Hill and himself, and Sudanese Customs documents which support his explanation. In February 1961, after his arrival in Kenya, he sold the refrigerator for £40 to A.M. KAKA, of Kitale. He denies possessing any secret government files. With his permission I searched his room at the Metropole Hotel, South Street, Kampala where he is staying. I did not find any Sudanese Government documents or files. In conversation he told me that the Northern Sudanese and the Arabs were oppressing the Southern Sudanese and he feared for the safety of himself and his family.

3. Deng is mentioned in Special Branch file FF/3547/Vol V. which relates to his request for political asylum. There is no record of him in the C.R.O. or in the C.I.D. Registry.

(signed) B. ILLINGWORTH
A.S.P. (C.I.D.)

1967

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

VS 1821/9.

FROM Mr Brenchley,
Khartoum, to
Mr Smith.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1591.

Dated April 4.

Received April 8.

SUBJECT:

Sudan Refugees. -

Representatives will be put to the Sudan Govt.
asking them to persuade the refugees to
return to the Sudan in peace.

1821

References

VS 1821/7.

VS 1821/1

MINUTES

There are risks in both action and
inaction. On the whole I prefer action, but
I am by no means sure. Draft. See
also -/10 (Flag D).

Amr Craig
21/4

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

Off K. Woolverton, C.O.
from Mr Craig. 25/4
Off Mr Brenchley, Khartoum
from Mr Beith. 1/5.
Off Mr Webber, C.O. from
Mr Smith. 3/5.

A) Mr Webber, C.O. to Mr Craig. LAF. 430/671/02. 27/4.

Mr Beith asked me to find out the
C.O.'s views on this matter. They wanted
time to consider it; so I sent them a
copy of the draft letter to Khartoum. They
have now replied. The point at X in
Mr Webber's letter seems well-taken.

Amr Craig

27/4

The point at X would be
well taken if we could rely on
the Ugandan authorities to catch

/the

-139

the refugees out if they misbehave! But
I agree that we should be moved by the
rules of the C.E. & by E-living & I attach
fresh maps.

KS with 28
IV
KSN TH

Amie
Hr

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CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY,
KHARTOUM.

1591

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ARCHIVES

-8 APR 1961

VS1821/9

April 4, 1961.

Dear Howard,

I have asked the Ambassador the answer to the question raised in your letter VS 1821/7 of April 1. His impression was that the Foreign Minister merely regarded the idea of peaceful persuasion as a good one, but would not necessarily do anything to put it into effect. (The causal connexion between thought and action is not so close in Khartoum as in London.) It is probable, therefore, that action will await the return of Mohammed Osman Yassein and even then may need a prod from us.

2. Incidentally, paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 291 of March 21, as well as your letter under reference, seem to indicate some development in thinking on this subject. In the past we had had the impression that you thought it better that these refugees should remain in Kampala, rather than be returned to the Sudan. We had therefore not been pressing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a reply to our representations about the refugees: so long as they did not reply, the men stayed in Uganda and indeed it seemed to us conceivable that the Ministry, while agreeing with our thesis that this was the best solution, might choose to achieve it by never replying to our representations, rather than lose face by admitting that we were right.

3. We were therefore a little surprised by the eagerness you now show to get the Sudan Government to take urgent action to persuade them to return. Is this because their presence in Uganda is becoming increasingly difficult administratively? Or do you foresee that it will lead to political trouble? However this may be, we will do our best to spur Mohammed Osman Yassein into action on his return but, frankly, we are very doubtful indeed of the powers of the Sudan Government to persuade these refugees to return voluntarily to the Sudan. But it is certainly worth trying.

Yours ever,

Frank Brenchley

(T.F.Brenchley)

H.F.T.Smith, Esq.,
North and East African
Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



COLONIAL OFFICE
GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.1
Telephone: ABBey 1266, ext.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES

1 MAY 1961

Our reference: EAF.430/671/02
Your reference: VS.1821/9

27th April, 1961.

VS.1821/9(A)

Dear Sir,

Please refer to your letter of the 25th April about the Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

2. We have considered the draft reply you have prepared to Brenchley's letter of the 4th April but we are not entirely happy about the proposal to prod the Sudanese Government into action on an issue which, as Brenchley suggests, they might have found it convenient to ignore. We take your point about the possibility of the refugees carrying on embarrassing political activities from within Uganda but in these circumstances we should be given a heaven-sent opportunity to repatriate them forthwith and reasons to support such action. You will recall that in paragraph 4 of Uganda savingram personal No. 2 of the 13th January and again in paragraph 3 of savingram personal No. 8 of the 6th February the Governor reported that the refugees had clearly been given to understand the terms of their refugee

/permits

A. J. M. CRAIG, ESQ.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

permits and these included refraining from political activities against the Sudan.

3. We wonder, therefore, whether it would not be wiser in the circumstances to let the Sudan Government play this their way since we appear to be the ones most affected by bringing to a head the controversial issue of forcible repatriation.

Yours sincerely

F. D. Webber

(F. D. WEBBER)

CONFIDENTIAL

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Registry
No.

Top Secret.
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Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft. letter to
T.F. Brenchley
Esq., Khartoum

from Mr. J.G.S.
Beith.

Flag A

A

AJMC

Cancel.

Thank you for your letter of April 4
about Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

2. We are between the devil and the deep
blue sea. If we return these men forcibly
to the Sudan we shall be criticised. But we
are also likely to suffer embarrassment if
they continue to stay in Uganda, and to
oblige them to return might be the lesser of
two evils. The recent affair of their
passports (your telegram number 318) is an
example of what may happen. If they have
collected enough money to pay their fares to
England, they must have friends and resources
(of which we know nothing at present) who
may very well help them, and even urge them,
to follow more troublesome policies. We fear
that it may be beyond the resources of the
Uganda authorities to seal them off from such
contacts,

3. We doubt whether this is a problem which
time will mend, and unless the men can be
persuaded to return of their own free will we
shall have to decide, as quickly as possible,
whether to force their return. Therefore,
slight though the chances of success may be, we
should like to urge the Sudan Government to do
what they can, and without delay, to persuade
them to move back to the Sudan. If the
Sudan Government will not exert themselves,
this may strengthen the argument against forcing
the men to return. On the other hand if
the Sudan Government make a fair offer which
the refugees reject it would strengthen our
hand in defending a decision to repatriate them
by force.

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AJMC

Draft. letter to
T.F. Brenchley
Esq.

Khartoum

from Mr. J.G.S.
Beith.

flag A

and to arrange them
to return might be
the lesser of two evils.

may be beyond the
resources of the
Uganda authorities to
send them off from
such contacts.

Therefore

Bag Sunday 2.30

We are between the Devil & the Deep Blue Sea. If

Thank you for your letter of April
4 about Sudanese refugees in Uganda.
2. ~~It is true that to forcibly~~ ^{return}
~~all these men~~ ^{to the Sudan might cause us}
~~shall be obliged.~~
~~use~~ ^{embarrassment} which we are of course
~~anxious to avoid.~~ But ~~we feel that~~
~~are~~ ^{likely to}
we ~~shall~~ also ^{suffer} embarrassment if they
continue to stay in Uganda. The recent
affair of their passports (your telegram
number 318) is an example of what may
happen. If they have collected enough
money to pay their fares to England, they
must have friends and resources (of which
we know nothing at present) who may very
well help them, and even urge them, to follow
more troublesome policies. ~~We fear that it is~~
~~We don't~~ ^{whether this is a problem which time}
3. ~~Altogether, then, we should like to~~
~~will men, and unless we can~~ ^{the men can be}
~~see this incident closed.~~ The ideal
~~persuaded to return of their own free will we shall~~
~~solution would be to have them return to~~
~~have to decide, as quickly as possible, whether to force~~
~~their country quietly of their own free~~
~~their return.~~ ^{But, right through the chances of}
~~will.~~ If this will not work, we shall
~~success may be, we should like to urge the~~
~~have to think again; but my own view is that~~
~~would~~ ^{Sudan Govt. to do what they can,}
~~it will be best to send them back quickly,~~
~~without delay, to persuade them to move back to~~
~~whether they like it or not, rather than~~
~~the Sudan. If the Sudan Govt. will not exert themselves,~~
~~have the affair drag on and be a constant~~
~~this may strengthen the argument against forcing~~
~~the~~

~~source of friction between us and~~
~~the Sudanese.~~

the men to return. ~~On~~ On the other hand if
the Sudan Govt. make a fair offer
which the refugees reject it would
strengthen our hand in regarding a
decision to repatriate them by force.

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Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
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HFTS

28/4

Draft.

Letter to:

Mr. Breckley,
Khartoum

From:

Mr. Beith

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

before they
attract
publicity
and boil
up into
an issue
(eg. the
Bahrain is
in St
Helena)

Thank you for your letter of April 4
about Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

2. We are between the devil and the deep
blue sea. If we return these men forcibly
to the Sudan we shall be criticised. But
we are also likely to suffer embarrassment
if they continue to stay in Uganda, and to
oblige them to return/might be the lesser of
two evils. The recent affair of their
passports (your telegram No. 318) is an
example of what may happen. If they have
collected enough money to pay their fares
to England, they must have friends and resources
(of which we know nothing at present) who
may very well help them, and even urge them,
make a nuisance of themselves.
to follow more troublesome policies. We
fear that it may be beyond the resources of
the Uganda authorities to seal them off from
such contacts, or to obtain evidence of political
activity which would justify us in saying
that the refugees had violated the conditions
of their stay// and must therefore be repatriated.

3. We were inclined therefore to take the
view that it was not in our interest or that
of Uganda to let the affair drag on, since
this would lead to increasing irritation on
the part of the Sudan Government. *=* The
longer the refugees remained the harder it
would be to get rid of them. But we note
your view that the Sudan Govt. may not be

/unduly

unduly worried and that the Ministry might prefer not to have to declare a firm position.

We have therefore discussed this again with the Colonial Office. ~~and~~ They feel that there would be advantage in leaving it to the Sudan Govt. to make the running. ~~We~~ ^{if} we can regard the ball as being in their court since we have put forward the idea that they should try to persuade the men to return.

and we are not ~~called upon to urge them~~ ^{going to press them} to reply. *It is for them to reply to this in their own good time,*

4. We accept this advice, and you should not take the initiative in raising the matter again with the Sudanese. At the same time we have reminded the C.O. of the danger to both U.K. and Uganda interests if the refugees were to engage in any political activities, and we have asked that a very close watch should be kept on them. *we still*

have an uncomfortable feeling that it might be safer to send the refugees back before something blows up. What do you think?

*just
MAY 1*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

(VS 1821/9)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

May 1, 1961.

Thank you for your letter of April 4 about Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

2. We are between the devil and the deep blue sea. If we return these men forcibly to the Sudan we shall be criticised. But we are also likely to suffer embarrassment if they continue to stay in Uganda, and to oblige them to return before they attract publicity and boil up into an issue (e.g. the BBahrainis in St. Helena) might be the lesser of two evils. The recent affair of their passports (your telegram No. 318) is an example of what may happen. If they have collected enough money to pay their fares to England, they must have friends and resources (of which we know nothing at present) who may very well help them, and even urge them, to make a nuisance of themselves. We fear that it may be beyond the resources of the Uganda authorities to seal them off from such contacts, or to obtain evidence of political activity which would justify us in saying that the refugees had violated the conditions of their stay and must therefore be repatriated.

3. We were inclined therefore to take the view that it was not in our interest or that of Uganda to let the affair drag on, since this would lead to increasing irritation on the part of the Sudan Government. The longer the refugees remained the harder it would be to get rid of them. But we note your view that the Sudan Government may not be unduly worried and that the Ministry might prefer not to have to declare a firm position. We have therefore discussed this again with the Colonial Office. They feel that there would be advantage in leaving it to the Sudan Government to make the running. We can regard the ball as being in their court since we have put forward the idea that they should try to persuade the men to return. It is for them to reply to this in their own good time, and we are not obliged to press them.

4. We accept this advice, and you should not take the initiative in raising the matter again with the Sudanese. At the same time we have reminded the Colonial Office of the danger to both U.K. and Uganda interests if the refugees were to engage in any political activities, and we have asked that a very close watch should be kept on them. We still have an uncomfortable feeling that it might be safer to send the refugees back before something blows up. What do you think?

(J.G.S. Beith)

T.F. Brenchley, Esq.,
Khartoum.

CONFIDENTIAL

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(VS 1821/9)

April 25, 1961.

We spoke on the telephone yesterday about the alternatives before us in the matter of the Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

2. I now enclose a copy of Brenchley's letter from Khartoum and of a draft reply which we have prepared here. I should be grateful for your comments on this draft. We should like to catch next Monday's bag.

(A.J.M. Craig)

K. Woolverton Esq.,
East African Department,
Colonial Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Thank you for your letter of April 4 about Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

_____ AJMC

letter to
T.F. Brenchley
Esq., Khartoum

from Mr. J.G.S.
Beith.

Flag A

2. We are between the devil and the deep blue sea. If we return these men forcibly to the Sudan we shall be criticised. But we are also likely to suffer embarrassment if they continue to stay in Uganda, and to oblige them to return might be the lesser of two evils. The recent affair of their passports (your telegram number 318) is an example of what may happen. If they have collected enough money to pay their fares to England, they must have friends and resources (of which we know nothing at present) who may very well help them, and even urge them, to follow more troublesome policies. We fear that it may be beyond the resources of the Uganda authorities to seal them off from such contacts.

3. We doubt whether this is a problem which time will mend, and unless the men can be persuaded to return of their own free will we shall have to decide, as quickly as possible, whether to force their return. Therefore, slight though the chances of success may be, we should like to urge the Sudan Government to do what they can, and without delay, to persuade them to move back to the Sudan. If the Sudan Government will not exert themselves, this may strengthen the argument against forcing the men to return. On the other hand if the Sudan Government make a fair offer which the refugees reject it would strengthen our hand in defending a decision to repatriate them by force.

CONFIDENTIAL

2/60

WV

TO

Registry
No. VS1821/9

Top Secret.
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Open.

HFTB

28/4

Draft.

Letter to:

F.D.
Mr. Webber,
Colonial Office

CMC. M.C. T.D.

From:

S. I. L.
Mr. G. I. S.
H. F. T. SMITH.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

B. I. K.



RECEIVED IN	
DIVISION	
-1 MAY 1961	
SENT TO	1/5.
BY	
DISPATCHED	

Thank you for your letter of April 27 about Sudanese refugees in Uganda. In view of what you say we are instructing the Embassy, as you will see from the enclosed copy of a letter, to play this question ~~long and~~ leave it to the Sudan Government to make the next move. ~~Although we must necessarily~~ be concerned about the consequences of this affair for United Kingdom relations with the Sudan, we recognise that full weight must be given to Uganda's interests and if you consider that it would be preferable to avoid action, so long as possible, we will accept ~~that.~~

2. I think ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~is~~ should be wise, however, to give some thought to the way things may develop. If these people remain in Uganda it is hard to believe that they will not engage in political activities, even if these consist only of maintaining contact, and perhaps passing advice through intermediaries, with people still in the Sudan. The Sudan Govt. would certainly regard this as political activity hostile to them and I think we should have to recognise it as such, and proceed to repatriation. I realise that it is not always easy to detect activity of ~~that~~ ^{this} kind and that ~~it~~ ^{520.50} makes exceptional calls on the local Security Services. But I think that if the refugees are to be allowed to remain, the Security Services must be

/prepared

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

prepared to keep a very close eye on them.

~~Thus If you think there is any doubt about~~ *It would perhaps be as well to emphasize this*

these perhaps you would be good enough to

seek the necessary assurances about them.

~~from the Uganda Govt.~~

point to the Uganda Govt.

*HO
May 1*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

(VS 1821/9)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

May 3, 1961.

CONFIDENTIAL

Thank you for your letter of April 27 about Sudanese refugees in Uganda. In view of what you say we are instructing the Embassy, as you will see from the enclosed copy of a letter, to play this question long and leave it to the Sudan Government to make the next move.

2. I think it would be wise, however, to give some thought to the way things may develop. If these people remain in Uganda it is hard to believe that they will not engage in political activities, even if these consist only of maintaining contact, and perhaps passing advice through intermediaries, with people still in the Sudan. The Sudan Government would certainly regard this as political activity hostile to them and I think we should have to recognise it as such, and proceed to repatriation. I realise that it is not always easy to detect activity of this kind and that to do so makes exceptional calls on the local Security Services. But I think that if the refugees are to be allowed to remain, the Security Services must be prepared to keep a very close eye on them. It would perhaps be as well to emphasise this point to the Uganda Government.

(H.F.T. Smith)

F.D. Webber, Esq., C.M.G., M.C. T.D.,
Colonial Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

1961

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

VS 1821/10

FROM

Chancery, Khartoum
(commnd)

SUBJECT:

Sudanese Refugees. -

It appears that no action will be taken
by the Sudan Govt. until the P.U.S. for
Foreign Affairs returns from Europe.

Fate of the revolver and documents taken
by WILLIAM DENG from the Sudan.
(add's'd Entebbe)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

No.

1591

Dated

April, 10.

Received

April, 14.

References

VS 1821/7, /4.
18.

MINUTES

Cypr to the Woolverton
Co.

Am Craig
2/14

Amme
5/5

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

Chad) Mr Woolverton, CO.
9/5.

(Action
completed)

(Main Indexed)

(1591)
SECRET



RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES

14 APR 1961

VS1821/10.

April 10, 1961.

✓

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF THE
CHANCERY

North & East African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
KHARTOUM,
SUDAN.

SECRET

(1591)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

KHARTOUM.

April 10, 1961.

Dear Office,

Please refer to the Governor's telegram No. 319 Saving of March 22 enclosing CID report F/9/61/3 on an interview with William Deng.

2. When the Chargé d'Affaires called on the Acting Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 5 on another subject, he tried to find out from him whether his Minister had taken any action towards persuading the Sudanese refugees in Kampala to return voluntarily to the Sudan (our telegram No. 255 to Foreign Office). The A./P.U.S. had no information, so it seems almost certain that no action will be taken until after the P.U.S. returns from Europe.

3. Brenchley was also told that the Sudanese Ministry of the Interior had informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that William Deng had taken with him to Kenya a revolver belonging to the Sudan Government and some secret files from his office. He said that he had heard that the revolver had been handed in, and arrangements had been made for it to be returned to the Sudanese authorities the next time any of their officials in Equatoria paid a liaison visit to Lodwar (Governor Kenya's telegram No. 260 of March 13 to Colonial Office). The A./P.U.S. suggested that it should instead be handed over to the Sudanese Consul-General in Kampala, and Brenchley said that we would try to arrange this. If you see no objection, will you please arrange with the Kenya authorities to do this?

4. To the enquiry about the files Brenchley replied that we had had no news of them. He did not disclose that a search for them had already been made without result. Presumably all that the Sudan Government know is that some files are missing. It may be that Deng misplaced them (or disposed of them) before leaving for Kenya. He may not be likely to admit this, but in view of representations we have now received could you please arrange for the question to be put to him? Unless the matter is cleared up, the Sudanese authorities will inevitably believe that the files are in British hands.

5. We are sending copies of this letter to the North & East African Department of the Foreign Office and to the Chief Secretary's Office in Nairobi. We also enclose a spare copy which you may wish to pass to the CID at Kampala.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

Chief Secretary's Office,
ENTEBBE.

SECRET

V

North and East African Department

V S 1821/11

1961

SUDAN

FROM

Khartoum
(M. Breuchley)

SECRET

No.

318.

Dated

April 17

Received

April 17.

SUBJECT:

Sudanese Refugees. —

The passports of all eight refugees
have been invalidated.

References

MINUTES

Cyng to Mr Woolverton. Anne
19/4

A) Uganda Tel. to C.O., W^o 101, April, 14.

I am not sure that this was wise
but since we did not see Uganda
tel. no. 101 until the morning of April 17, there
was nothing we could do to stop it.

Anne
21/4

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

chd) Mr Woolverton, 10.
5/5.

(Action
completed)


Alley.
10/5/61.

(Main Indexed)

all
9/4/61

SECRET

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE



Cypher /OTP

Mr Brenchley

No. 318

April 17, 1961

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

D. 12.34 p.m. April 17, 1961

R. 12.45 p.m. April 17, 1961

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Entebbe telegram No. 28 of April 17.

Repeated for information to Foreign Office.

Your telegram No. 2136: Sudanese Refugees.

1. Approached Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding invalidation of passports and he promised immediate action.

2. We have today received confirmation from the Ministry of the Interior that passports of all eight refugees have now been invalidated. This information is being sent to Sudanese Consul General at Kampala by Minister for Foreign Affairs.

DISTRIBUTED TO:

N.E.A.D.

W.C.A.D.

United Nations Department.

Information Policy Department.

News Department.

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

Sir. R. Stevens.

Head of N.E.A.D.

bbbbb



SECRET

SECRET

p/w

INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

FROM UGANDA (Sir F. Crawford)

Cypher (O.T.P.)

D. 14th April, 1961.

R. 14th " " 13.20 hrs.

SECRET AND PERSONAL
PERSONAL No. 101



Addressed to Ambassador Khartoum No. 2136.
Repeated to S. of S.

Sudanese Refugees.

Saturnino and Oduho having obtained money from sources unknown now say they wish to leave Uganda for the United Kingdom. We can prevent this this under provisions of the Control of Alien Refugees Ordinance but prevention is made a little more difficult by the fact that both these men hold valid Sudanese passports issued in 1958.

Is there any possibility of Sudanese Government being asked to invalidate these passports as a matter of urgency in order to ease our position?

SECRET

1961

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

V S 1821/12.

FROM Mr Peter Kilner,
to Mr Craig.
(communication)

No.

Dated

Received

April, 27.

SUBJECT:

Sudanese Refugees. -

Details about SATUWIDIO LAITORE,
JOSEPH ODUHO and FERDINAND ADYANG.Imprisonment of former M.H.R. - Defence
of the Sudan Act 1958, - Exit Visas.

1821

References

MINUTES

This was given me by Mr Kilner,
former editor of the Khartoum Morning
News and now in London writing a
book on the Sudan. He can be
reached c/o the Oxford & Cambridge
Club; on the Sudan Embassy have
his private telephone number.

Done
28/4

(Action
completed)

(Main Indexed)

1. Political Refugees

Saturnino Lohure, of Latukho tribe, Torit District, Equatoria. Aged about 37. Roman Catholic priest. Chosen by agreement between all Christian bodies as representative of Christians on National Constitution Committee, which first met in September 1956. Elected Member of House of Representatives for Torit North, February 1958, as an independent candidate. Elected President of the Southern Sudanese Federal Block (of 39 Members of House of Representatives), March 1958, following general meeting of new Southern M.H.Rs and dissolution of parliamentary Liberal Party.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
27 APR 1961

VS1821/12

Joseph Oduho, of Latukho tribe. Aged 33. Intermediate Schoolmaster 1955, following schooling at Rumbek Secondary School and Institute of Education. Following August 1955 mutiny and disturbances, was arrested, charged with abetting murder, sentenced to death and held at Meridi prison, but conviction was quashed by Chief Justice Abu-Rannat on review. Elected M.H.R. February 1958 for Torit South-East, as Liberal Party candidate.

Ferdinand Adyang, of Didinga tribe, Eastern District, Equatoria. Aged about 38. Elected M.H.R. in November 1953. Following August 1955 mutiny, arrested and convicted of ~~receiving~~ purchasing ~~cheese~~ stolen wireless set, sentenced to two years' prison but conviction quashed by Chief Justice in January 1956 as charge against him unfounded. Re-elected M.H.R. in February 1958 for Nagichot and appointed Minister for Mineral Resources (on the nomination of People's Democratic Party), March 1958.

2. Imprisonment of Former M.H.R.

Saturnino Lohure and others are reported to have fled from Sudan in December 1960. According to 'The Sudan Daily' (20 Dec 60) at that time Province Judge, Southern Circuit, passed sentence of 12 years' prison on former M.H.R. (and R.C. priest) Paulino Dogale and 10 years' imprisonment each on three Rumbek School students for publishing a provocative leaflet in March 1960. Paulino Dogale had been held in prison since July 1960 and the schoolboys from slightly earlier. The nature of the provocative leaflet is not known but it seems likely to have been connected with the change-over of weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday, which had been announced in February 1960 and caused students at Rumbek and at Juba Commercial Secondary School to strike, the schools being temporarily closed. The charge was brought and sentence passed under sections of the Sudan Defence of the Sudan Act 1958.

3. Defence of the Sudan Act 1958

Under this Act, which became law in December 1958 shortly after the military take-over of government, sentence of death or of imprisonment for from ten years to life may be passed for crimes 'against the State or the Armed Forces' and the Act's clauses enumerate among these possible crimes - incitement to opposition against the government or shaking confidence in the government, organizing any meeting or demonstration, bringing illegitimate pressure on the government or 'undertaking any action aimed at changing the social system or disturbing it'. Under the Act, the government is empowered to try cases by military tribunal or transfer cases from civil to military courts. The scope of the Act is extremely wide and would seem virtually to negate the 'rule of law'.

4. Exit Visas

By ordinance promulgated during 1960 it is obligatory for Sudanese as well as foreigners to obtain an exit visa before leaving the Sudan. To leave without such a visa is in itself a breach of the law and prosecution could perhaps be brought under the all-embracing Defence of the Sudan Act 1958.

1961

NORTH AND EAST AFRICAN
DEPARTMENT.

SUDAN

VS1821/13/G

FROM Mr. Brenchley,
Khartoum, to Mr. Beith.

TOP SECRET

No. 1591G

Dated May 2

Received May 5

SUBJECT:

Sudanese Refugees in Uganda.

Help and resources being received by them in Kampala;
suspicious contacts with the French Consul in Kampala.

References

VS 1821/9

MINUTES

Dray to Co.

Am Craig
(A.J.M. CRAIG)

16/5

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

Mr. Webb, C.O.,
from Mr. Beith
18/5

P.U.S.D. (Mr. Day) aka H251,-
Central Dept
(to whom I can give the
background if they wish)

I think we must certainly pass this on. But
it could lead to a tricky situation or I
have added to the draft.

Smith 16/5
MSMITH

I should like to know who
these refugees are & why the French
should wish to help them if it
is possible without too much trouble
Phase.

(Action
Completed)

(Main Indexed)

30/5

11/7/61

Spoken to Miss Collins

29/5

John Collins
29/5

TOP SECRET

enter/G.

(1591G)



British Embassy,
KHARTOUM

May 2, 1961

My dear John,

I have replied under confidential cover to your letter VS 1821/9 of May 1 about Sudanese refugees in Uganda, but there is one point on which I should like to make separate comment.

2. You say that these men must have friends and resources of which we know nothing at present, helping them in Kampala. If the Uganda Government really have no idea of the source from which money is reaching them, I suggest that they keep a close eye on their contacts with the French Consul in Kampala. There were strong rumours in the past that Father Saturnino was a French agent and I have certainly noticed that the members of the French Embassy staff here, from the Ambassador downwards, show an unnaturally lively interest in their future. At the time when the Sudan press was publishing rumours that they were about to be handed back, someone from the French Embassy came round to see us almost daily on some pretext or other and invariably turned the conversation eventually to enquiries about these rumours and expressions of horror at the idea that there might be any truth in them.

3. I have, of course, no concrete evidence to go on but the above seems at least sufficient grounds for suspicion.

Yours ever,

T.F. Brenchley

(T.F. Brenchley)

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,
North and East African Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

TOP SECRET

Registry
No.

TOP SECRET

1872
1874

Top Secret.

Secret.

Confidential.

Restricted.

Open.

AJMC

16/5

Draft.

Letter to:

F.D. Webber,
Esq., C.M.G.,
Colonial Office

From:

Mr. Beith

Enclosures:

Mr. Brenchley's
letter of May 2
(VS 1821/13/G)



W. S. L. 16/5

RECEIVED IN	
DIVISION	
12 MAY 1961	
SENT TO	18/5
BY	
CONTAINED	

I have written to you to-day about the Sudanese refugees in Uganda. You may find it useful to have a copy of a further letter from Brenchley in Khartoum about the sources of support which these men may be using. I hope you will feel able to pass Brenchley's advice on to the Security authorities in Uganda.

It would of course be a delicate matter, involving our relations with the French, if their consent were to be encouraged helping the refugees. If the Uganda authorities ^{succeeded} in getting any evidence of this, therefore, we hope they will feel able to let us know before taking action so that we may have an opportunity of giving advice on how to proceed.

May 17

TOP SECRET

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

outfile

TOP SECRET

(VS 1821/13/G)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

May 18, 1961.

Dear Webber

I have written to you to-day about the Sudanese refugees in Uganda. You may find it useful to have a copy of a further letter from Brenchley in Khartoum about the sources of support which these men may be using. I hope you will feel able to pass Brenchley's advice to the Security authorities in Uganda.

It would of course be a delicate matter, involving our relations with the French, if their Consul were to be discovered helping the refugees. If the Uganda authorities succeed in getting any evidence of this, therefore, we hope they will feel able to let us know before taking action so that we may have an opportunity of giving advice on how to proceed.

*Yours sincerely
John Beith*

(J.G.S. Beith)

F.D. Webber, Esq., C.M.G.,
Colonial Office.

TOP SECRET

1961

V

North and East African Department

V 51821/14

SUDAN

FROM Mr T.F. Brenchley,
Khartoum to Mr H.F.T.
Smith.

SUBJECT:

Sudanese Refugees in Kampala

CONFIDENTIAL.

Talk with Mohammed Osman Yassein; the refugees may be persuaded to return; Mohammed Osman Yassein will look into the whole matter again.

No. 1591

Dated May 1

Received May 5

1821

References

-/9 -/1

att/13G Sent to Dept

See now -/15

Done

16/5

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

185/61

9/11/61

CONFIDENTIAL



RECEIVED IN

AFRICA

5 MAY 1961

VS1821/14

(1591)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
KHARTOUM.

May 1, 1961.

Dear Howard,

- VS1821/9

I said in my letter 1591 of April 4 that we would do our best to spur Mohammed Osman Yassein into action over persuading the Southern refugees in Kampala to return voluntarily to the Sudan. He has now returned from his European tour and I had an opportunity to raise this matter with him this morning.

2. Unfortunately it rapidly became clear that he had, or pretended to have, a totally different recollection of his discussions in the Department on March 16 from that contained in your telegram No. 291 of March 21.

- VS1821/1

3. His story ran on much the same lines as set out in paragraph 2 of that telegram up to the question "could they not be taken to the border and given a push?", but to this question he claimed that he had been given a reluctant answer "yes". He claimed to have no recollection of any suggestion that the Sudan Government should persuade the men to return and said that he could certainly never have agreed to such a suggestion. It was obviously quite impracticable for them ever to do so, so long as the refugees were allowed to remain in Uganda.

4. I expressed considerable surprise at this misunderstanding and said that your report of the conversation had been quite clear. It was certainly quite impossible that you should have ever agreed that the refugees could be returned unobtrusively through administrative channels. Their presence in Kampala was far too well known both in Uganda and in the United Kingdom, for there to be any question of this. We were therefore back to the position reached at the time of the Ambassador's call on February 18, when he had left an aide memoire pointing out that the forcible return of these refugees would be likely to lead to publicity adverse to the Sudan and asking what the Sudan Government wished us to do after taking this fact into account. Mohammed Osman Yassein blustered about this a little, but I reminded him that it was in Khartoum that the story had been let out to the press and the possibility of an administrative solution thereby destroyed. He finally promised to have another look at the whole problem and to see me again about it in a week's time. (He has now put off his temporary secondment to the United Nations until the beginning of June). I will, of course, follow this up even if he fails to do so.

Yours ever,

Frank Brenchley

(T.F.Brenchley)

H.F.T.Smith, Esq.,
North and East African Dept.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

1967

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

V S1821/15.

FROM Mr T.F. Brenchley,
Khartoum to Mr J.G.S.
Beith.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1591

Dated May 2

Received May 3

SUBJECT:

Sudanese Refugees in Uganda

The best course of action would be for the refugees
to return to the Sudan, provided that they are not
victimised.

1821

References

VS1821/9

114

alt/13 G sent to
Dept.

MINUTES

Draft to Mr Webber in the Colonial Office.

Quinlan
16/5

I agree with the action proposed, but suggest
that after this letter has gone off Quinn
should produce a minute summarising the position,
since in view of the political implications it would
seem right to inform Sir R. Grevens.

JS with 16/5

Yes, please
by
May 17

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

off Mr F.D. Webber, C.O.
from Mr Beith.
16/5

(Action
completed)

18/3/67

(Main Indexed)

9/11/67

CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy,
KHARTOUM

May 2, 1961

ARCHIVES

8 MAY 1961

VS1821/15

(1591)

My dear John,

Your letter VS 1821/9 of May 1, about Sudanese refugees in Uganda, reached me just after I had raised this subject with Mohammed Osman Yassein, as reported in my letter 1591 of May 1.

- VS1821/14.

2. As you will have seen from the file, our view here has, from the beginning, been that we should do well to return these refugees to the Sudan, after obtaining a really watertight written guarantee that they will not be victimized. We still hold this view, despite the increased danger of publicity that has arisen meanwhile. The alternative, of the Uganda Government holding them in perpetuity (or at least until independence) seems likely to be a source of perpetual friction, as well as being a thorough nuisance to the Uganda authorities.

3. If, therefore, Mohammed Osman Yassein tells me in a week's time that the Sudan Government are prepared to risk the publicity consequent upon the return of these refugees, I think that the best course would be to ask the Colonial Office and the Uganda Government to draft a non-victimization guarantee satisfactory to them (and at the same time not unnecessarily insulting to the Sudan Government!) so that I can put it forward officially to the Sudanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I am glad to see that you are inclined to share this view.

4. Thank you for reminding the Colonial Office of the danger to United Kingdom and Uganda interests if the refugees were to engage in political activities while in Kampala. We sincerely hope that the watch on them will be close enough to prevent this and also to ensure that they do not slip out of the country.

Yours ever,

Frank Brenchley

(T.F. Brenchley)

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,
North and East African Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

VS1821/15.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

AJMQ

16/5

Draft.

Letter to:

F.D. Webber,
Esq., C.M.G.,
Colonial Office

From:

Mr. Beith

Enclosures:

2 copies of
Mr. Brenchley's
letters of
May 1
(VS 1821/14)
and May 2
(VS 1821/15)

Flag A

JS1.62/16

JS1.62/16



RECEIVED IN DIVISION	
17 MAY 1961	
SENT TO BY	17/5.
UNRECORDED	

CONFIDENTIAL

807
+0

18720
1875

I enclose copies of two letters we have had from Brenchley in Khartoum about the Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

2. We thought when we met Yassein that he was a slippery customer. His "recollection" of our conversation shows that our feeling was justified. But I am afraid it is

clear that the idea of persuading the refugees to go back peacefully is not going to work.

3. You will note Brenchley's view that if the Sudanese, after they have considered the

dangers of publicity, still want the men returned

~~we should comply, provided adequate guarantees can be arranged.~~ ^{Then will give} ~~can of non-victimisation.~~ On balance we agree and

I think that you originally took the same view (your letter EAF. 430/671/02 of February 14,

with its enclosure). If you still do,

perhaps you would warn ^{Uganda} ~~Kenya~~ to be thinking

about draft guarantees. The final decision

would, I am sure, have to be taken by Ministers in

view of probable criticism in the House.

1
May 17

CONFIDENTIAL

(VS 1821/15)

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

May 23, 1961.

I enclose copies of two letters we have had from Brenchley in Khartoum about the Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

2. We thought when we met Yassein that he was a slippery customer. His "recollection" of our conversation shows that our feeling was justified. But I am afraid it is clear that the idea of persuading the refugees to go back peacefully is not going to work.

3. You will note Brenchley's view that if the Sudanese, after they have considered the dangers of publicity, still want the men returned we should comply, provided they will give adequate guarantees of non-victimisation. On balance we agree and I think that you originally took the same view (your letter EAF. 430/671/02 of February 14, with its enclosure). If you still do, perhaps you would warn Uganda to be thinking about draft guarantees. The final decision would, I am sure, have to be taken by Ministers in view of probable criticism in the House.

F. D. Webber, Esq., C.M.G.,
Colonial Office.

(J. G. S. Beith)

CONFIDENTIAL

1967

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

V⁵ 1821/16

FROM C.O. to Uganda
(tel)

No. 74(5) (KAF/430/671/02)

Dated May, 15.

Received May, 16.

SUBJECT:

Sudan Refugees.

Agrees that the refugees should be moved away from the Northern Province.

Suggests that FATHER SATUAWINO might be separated from the others.

1821

References

117.

MINUTES

June
24/15

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

24/5/67

24/5/67

A. S. D. Craig P.O.



With the compliments of

Mr. Woolwich

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES

16 MAY 1961

VS1821/16

COLONIAL OFFICE

GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.1

Caf 430/671/02

15 861

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Saving

EAF 430/671/02

Your Ref: S.8306

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies

To the Officer Administering the Government of UGANDA

Date 15 May 1961

No. 74 Saving

PRIORITY

— VS 1821/17

Your savingram Personal No.22 of the 3rd May.

Sudanese Refugees in Uganda

— VS 1821/17

I observe from telegram Personal No.68 of the 9th May from the Governor of Tanganyika, repeated to me as Personal No.216, that Father Saturnino cannot be accepted as a refugee in Tanganyika. I realise that the continued presence of these refugees in Uganda presents a difficult problem but there is probably a much better chance of neutralising their political activities while they remain in the Protectorate, particularly since the conditions upon which they were issued with refugee permits expressly forbids them from engaging in activities which might embarrass Uganda or the Sudan.

2. I therefore warmly support your proposal to move the refugees away from the Northern Province and I assume that you will make arrangements for them to be kept under surveillance. Since Father Saturnino seems to exercise an undesirable influence over the other refugees no doubt you will consider whether he might be separated from his companions and settled in another part of the Protectorate.

SEGER.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

1961

V

North and East African Department

VS 1821/17.

SUDAN

FROM F.D. Webber, C.O.

to Mr Smith.

SECRET

No. EAF. 430/671/02.

Dated May, 11.

Received May, 12.

SUBJECT:

Sudan Refugees. -

Encloses a telegram from Uganda and a telegram from Tanganyika. (Nos 22(S) and 216). SATURNINO will not be accepted in Tanganyika. Agrees that the refugees should be closely supervised in Uganda and kept from the N. Province.

References

/16.

/9.

MINUTES

Amc
24/5

A) Khartoum, 15(S). 16/5.

(addressed to Uganda No 6(S))

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

B) C.O. to Uganda, Tel No 111(S) June, 30.

Amc
7/7

(Action completed)

Deley
24/5/61

(Main Indexed)

hsl
9/11/62

Number of copies.....

Number of copies
of enclosures

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

CONFIDENTIAL



COLONIAL OFFICE
GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.1
Telephone: ABBey 1266, ext.

RECEIVED IN
Enter
ARCHIVES

12 MAY 1961

US1821/17.

Our reference: EAF.430/671/02
Your reference:

11th May, 1961.

Dear Sir

Thank you for your letter of the 3rd May about the Sudanese refugees in Uganda. I now enclose a copy of a savingram from Uganda in which they suggest that Saturnino should be allowed to go to Tanganyika provided the authorities there are able effectively to control his movements. I also enclose a copy of a telegram from Tanganyika in which, rather to our relief, the Governor states that he could not consider accepting Saturnino as a refugee in Tanganyika. It seems to us that the Apostolic Delegate for East Africa is, in good faith, doing his best to help the refugees to air their grievances and this only confirms our impression that Uganda offers the best conditions for neutralising the refugees' political activities.

2. We will, as you suggest, emphasise to Uganda the need for the refugees to be closely supervised and we will also support the Governor's proposal to move the

/refugees

H. F. T. SMITH, ESQ.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

refugees away from the Northern Province
where they may be a source of embarrassment
both to the Sudan Government and the Uganda
Government.

In reply

M. Webb

(F. D. WEBBER)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

94

FROM TANGANYIKA (Governor's Deputy)

Cypher (O.T.P.)

D. 9th May, 1961.

R. 9th " " 10.15 hours.

PRIORITY

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PERSONAL No.216

Addressed to Governor Uganda Personal
No.68

Repeated " British Embassy Khartoum
(S. of S. please pass)
" " S. of S.

(93) No.22. Your savingram to Colonial Office Personal

Sudanese Refugees in Uganda.

I regret that I could not (repeat not) consider accepting Saturnino as a refugee in Tanganyika. I have not (repeat not) raised this with the Prime Minister, as so to do would place him in a position of grave embarrassment.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for repetition to Khartoum.)

SECRET

SECRET

Uganda Reference: S.8306

SAVING

From THE GOVERNOR OF UGANDA.

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

Date 3rd May, 1961.

Repeated: The Governor, Tanganyika
The British Ambassador,
Khartoum.

No. 22 Saving.

PRIORITYSUDANESE REFUGEES IN UGANDA

Please refer to past communications on this subject, ending with my telegram Personal No. 101, addressed to the Ambassador, Khartoum No. 2136 (not to Governor Tanganyika).

2. The position has now materially altered since Father Saturnino and Mr. Oduho have crashed and written off uninsured the car which they intended to sell in order to raise funds to reach the United Kingdom and their passports, having been invalidated by the Sudan Government, have now been withdrawn and will be retained here for the time being.

3. They still wish, however, to leave Uganda if they are allowed to do so because they fear for their own safety so near to the Sudan and because they wish to publicise their case, which they cannot effectively do from here. I am sure that these fears are unfounded and do not think they will attempt to leave without authority.

4. I think, however, that there would be great advantages if Saturnino could be allowed to go to Tanganyika, provided of course the Governor of Tanganyika has powers to prevent him from going elsewhere. My reasons for making this new suggestion are:

(i) I have recently interviewed the Apostolic Delegate for East Africa who is most anxious that Saturnino should be removed from both his present companions, and from Uganda, where he is likely to come continually to the notice of the Sudanese Government, and sent to Dar es Salaam. The Apostolic Delegate assured me that he foresaw no difficulty in preventing Saturnino from publicising his case in Dar es Salaam. He also indicated that Mr. Nyerere might also be persuaded not to take up the case, since it would be to the probable disadvantage of any Roman Catholics still in the Southern Sudan, and might in any case cause difficulties with the Moslems in Tanganyika.

(ii) Saturnino is the leader of the group and the one most feared by the Sudan Government. My task in settling the others in Uganda, where they will (as in the case of the many other earlier refugees from the Sudan) become absorbed and forgotten by the Sudan Government, would be considerably eased if his influence is taken away.

5. I shall be grateful if the Governor of Tanganyika will advise whether he is able and willing to assist by accepting Saturnino in Tanganyika. If this action is agreed his passport will not be returned to him but will be sent to the Governor of Tanganyika for retention.

SECRET

W. J. MARQUAND

CHIEF
REGISTER
8 MAY 1961

SECRET

SAVING

From THE GOVERNOR OF UGANDA.

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

Date

No. Saving.

2

6. I shall also be grateful if the British Ambassador, Khartoum, will advise whether Saturnino could be sent to Tanganyika without committing a breach of any undertaking he may have given to the Sudan Government as a result of my Secret and Personal telegram No. 2070 of the 16th February, 1961, in which I promised to do everything possible to ensure that these refugees did not leave Uganda for a third country. If such a breach would be committed I shall be grateful if the British Ambassador will approach the Sudan Government with a view to seeking its agreement to the action now proposed.

7. So far as the other refugees are concerned we are doing everything possible to persuade them to take up suitable employment in Uganda. They are in any case being moved out of the Northern Province at the request of the Sudanese authorities at Juba.

GOVERNOR

SECRET

(1591)

INWARD TELEGRAM

CL

Cypher XXXXXX code XXXXXX en clair
By bag 16.5.61.

Mr. T. P. Brenchley

From:—

KHARTOUM

To:—

GOVERNOR, UGANDA.

Dante

ADVANCE COPY

No 15 Saving to Fo

Despatched

Received

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
19 MAY 1961

No. *Saving 6* of May 16, 1961.

SECRET

Addressed to Governor, Uganda, Telegram No. *Saving 6* of May 16, 1961, repeated for information *Saving to* Foreign Office (15) and Governor, Tanganyika (8).

Your Secret and Personal telegram No. 22 *Saving of* May 3 to Secretary of State for the Colonies (received today).

...

Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

Your paragraph 6. Undertaking given to Sudan Government on basis of promise to which you refer would certainly preclude transfer of refugees to any third country, including Tanganyika.

2. In the light of Governor Tanganyika's telegram Personal No. 68 to you, I am taking no action on the request in the second sentence of your paragraph 6.

Vs1821/17? CHARGÉ d'AFFAIRES

Amme
24/5



Already V

SECRET

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM
FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By bag

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Brenchley
No. 15 Saving
May 16, 1961.

R. May 19, 1961.

SECRET

Addressed to Governor, Uganda telegram No. 6 Saving of
May 16

Repeated for information Saving to:- Foreign Office
Governor Tanganyika

Your Secret and Personal telegram No. 22 Saving of
May 3 to Secretary of State for the Colonies (received today).

Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

Your paragraph 6. Undertaking given to Sudan Government
on basis of promise to which you refer would certainly preclude
transfer of refugees to any third country, including
Tanganyika.

2. In the light of Governor Tanganyika's telegram
Personal No. 68 to you, I am taking no action on the request
in the second sentence of your paragraph 6.

DISTRIBUTED TO:-

United Nations Department
N.E.A.D.
W.C.A.D.

SECRET

H.F. T. Smith Esq.



With the compliments of

M. Svaepoel.

COLONIAL OFFICE

GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.1



ps.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
6 JUL 1961
VS1821/17(B)

SECRET AND PERSONAL

EAF. 142/1/p1

PRIORITY

S A V I N G

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

To the Officer Administering the Government of UGANDA.

DATE 30th June, 1961.

No. 111 Saving. PERSONAL

Mails.

VS1821 |

Your Secret and Personal savingram No. 22
of 3rd May.

Foreign Office inform me that copy of your
savingram under reference did not reach Khartoum
until 16th May. Grateful if you would check that
copy for Khartoum was correctly despatched.
If delay in fact occurred in the mails you may
wish to arrange for urgent communications to be
telegraphed to Khartoum even when, as in this case,
the communication is a repetition of a savingram
addressed to me.

2. Grateful to be informed of the result of
your check.

SECEP.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

1961

V

North and East African Department

SUDAN

V S 1821/18.

FROM *Chancery, Khartoum*
(comps. slip)

SUBJECT:

Sudan Refugees.

No. *SCR/MFA/35-D9*

Dated *May, 11.*

Received *May, 15.*

Sudanese M.F.A. Note of May, 7, giving a list of names of the Sudanese nationals in Uganda whose passports and travelling documents have been withdrawn.

1821

References

MINUTES

Agree
24/5

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action completed)

Alley.
24/5/61

(Main Indexed)

all
23/11/62

Number of copies.....

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of enclosures

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE



RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES

15 MAY 1961

May 11, 1961.

VS1821/18.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF THE
CHANCERY

North & East African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
KHARTOUM,
SUDAN.

~~COPY~~

SCR/MFA/35-D-9

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Khartoum, and has the honour to inform the esteemed Embassy that His Excellency the Minister of Interior has used his powers according to para 9 (2) of the Passport and Immigration Regulations 1960, to withdraw the passports and travelling documents of the following Sudanese Nationals who are now in Uganda:-

	Passport No.	Date of Issue
1) Fr. SATURNING LOMURE	6292	29/8/1958
2) NATHAWIEL OYET	20617	1/3/1960
3) JOSEPU ODWHU	8123	14/10/58
4) PANKRASTO OCEAWG		
5) FERDINAND ADYANG	18904	17/5/1955
6) ALEX MABLE		
7) WILLIAM DENG	25118	16/5/1960

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed Embassy the assurance of its highest consideration.

Khartoum, 7th May, 1961.

To:

THE BRITISH EMBASSY,
KHARTOUM.

V

North and East African Department

V S.1821/19.

1961

SUDAN

FROM

Mr Breuchley,
Wharfburn.

SUBJECT:

Sudan Refugees.

CONFIDENTIAL

No.

390,

Dated

May, 20.

Received

May, 22.

A Note has been received from the
Sudan M.F.A. asking H.M.G. to press the
Uganda Govt. for the return of the refugees.
Lines the terms of the Sudan Govt. guarantee
of non-victimization.

References

JS1062/7.(61)

VS1821/16.

- In Dept
23/5

MINUTES

Submission has been made.

Done
26/5

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action
completed)

Ady.
29/5/61

(Main Indexed)

adl
9/11/62

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION


Mr. Brenchley

No. 390

May 20, 1961

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL



D. 5.43 p.m. May 20, 1961

R. 6.56 p.m. May 20, 1961

✓

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 390 of
May 20.

Repeated for information to Entebbe.

And Saving to:- Nairobi

Dar-es-Salaam.

VS1821/16

My letter of May 15 about Sudanese refugees in Uganda (not to all).

We have now received a Note from Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking us to intervene with Uganda Government to achieve immediate return of seven named refugees, omitting Aggrey Jaden, "because their sudden disappearance has caused a great deal of anxiety to their parents and dependents who have been continually pressing for their return".

2. The Note further states that Sudan Government "formally express that:

(i) They will not be put up for trial or subjected to any bodily injury as a result of their having left the country.

(ii) Their return will not be subject of publicity in Sudan Press.

(iii) The Government of the Republic of the Sudan will not feel hurt by criticism that might appear in foreign Press relating to its internal policy in connexion with the reason that compelled those nationals to take such steps as they have done".

3. I shall be grateful to know if you and Governor Uganda consider this a sufficient guarantee of non victimization. As

/regards

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum telegram No. 390 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

JS1062/7 (61)

regards value of guarantee I cannot add to my telegram No. 79.

4. Although Aggrey Jaden's name is omitted (presumably in error) I recommend he be treated on the same basis as the other refugees.

5. Full text of Note follows by bag.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Dar-es-Salaam as my telegram No. 9.

[Copy sent to Telegram Section Colonial Office for repetition Saving to Dar-es-Salaam]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

N.E.A.D.

W.C.A.D.

United Nations Department

Information Policy Department

Information Research Department

Information Executive Department

News Department

EEEEEEEE

CONFIDENTIAL

1961

V

North and East African Department

VS 1821/20

SUDAN

FROM Mr Breuchley,
Khartoum, to
Mr Beith.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1591.
Dated May, 15.
Received May, 23.

SUBJECT:

Sudan Refugees. -

The Sudan Govt. have not yet taken any action.

The Embassy would have had strong objections if Saturnino had been moved to Tanganyika.

References

115, 19.

In Dept 23/5

MINUTES

Dt Letter to J Breuchley & J Webber CO.

NS with 2/3

June 2

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

Dt. Mr Breuchley,
Khartoum, from Mr
J.E.S. Beith. 5/6
Off M Webber, CO
from M Smith
5/6.

(Action completed)

[Signature]

(Main Indexed)

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr. Smith
Mr. Craig
British Embassy,
KHARTOUM

encl
W

(1591)

May 15, 1961

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVE
23 MAY 1961

Dear John,

VS1821/15

VS1821/20

My letter 1591 of May 2 about Sudanese refugees in Uganda.

2. As I more than half expected, when, as pre-arranged, I called on Mohammed Osman Yassein to hear the Sudan Government's decision about the return of these refugees, it was quite clear that he had done nothing about it. He again promised to let me know their decision after discussing it further with the Minister for Foreign Affairs but he has not done so. In the light of the first sentence of paragraph 4 of your letter VS 1821/9 of May 1, I will leave the matter there unless you instruct me to the contrary.

3. We were a little surprised to receive a copy of a telegram from the Governor of Tanganyika to the Governor of Uganda refusing to have Father Saturnino in Tanganyika since we did not know that the idea of his being allowed to go to Tanganyika was under discussion. We would in fact have had strong objections to such a transfer but, since the Governor of Tanganyika refused, there was no need for us to voice them.

4. We were also surprised to learn a few days ago that the Sudanese refugees are not being confined in Kampala as we had believed but are being kept in the north-east of Uganda fairly close to the Sudan and Congo borders. This seems to give them quite unnecessary opportunities to escape into the Congo, but we heard at the same time that plans were already afoot to move them further south to Mbale, near the Kenya frontier. This seems a much safer area.

Yours ever,

Frank Brenchley

(T.F. Brenchley)

/ P.S.

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,
North and East African Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



-2-

P.S. May 16, 1961

I have now received a copy of Governor Uganda's telegram No. 22 Saving to the Colonial Office of May 3, which sheds more light on the points raised at paragraphs 3 and 4 above. The slowness of our receipt of savingsgrams from the British territories in East Africa is really a considerable nuisance but I suppose that nothing can be done about it.

*On the contrary:
let's complain
L*

F.B.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

HFTS

2/6

Draft.

Letter to:

Mr. Brechley,
Khartoum.

From:

Mr. Beith

+ alternative
solutions

RECEIVED IN DIVISION	
-5 JUN 1961	
SENT TO BY	5/4
FORWARDED	5/6

18 10 5/6 5/12

Your telegram No. 390 of May 20 reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had formally asked for the return of the Sudanese refugees in Uganda. This letter is to warn you that it may be a little while before we can send instructions, and that the view in Whitehall is likely to be against asking the Uganda Govt. to return the men. The matter is now being discussed by Ministers, ~~who are also considering various ways in which the rejection of the Sudanese request might be presented, so as to soften the blow to them.~~ I will let you know as soon as possible what emerges from these discussions, and we have asked that we should be given an opportunity of consulting you about how to present the matter before definite instructions are sent to you. In the meantime I fear you will have to adopt stalling tactics if the Sudanese authorities return to the charge.

2. I have noted the postscript to your letter of May 15, about the delay with which Savingsgrams from the British territories in East Africa reach you, and we are looking into this.

10
June 2

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(VS 1821/20)

June 5, 1961.

Your telegram No. 390 of May 20 reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had formally asked for the return of the Sudanese refugees in Uganda. This letter is to warn you that it may be a little while before we can send instructions, and that the view in Whitehall is likely to be against asking the Uganda Government to return the men. The matter is now being discussed by Ministers. I will let you know as soon as possible what emerges from these discussions, and we have asked that we should be given an opportunity of consulting you about how to present the matter before definite instructions are sent to you. In the meantime I fear you will have to adopt stalling tactics if the Sudanese authorities return to the charge.

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(J.G.S. Beith)

T.F. Brenchley, Esq.,
Khartoum.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

W.58575/319. Mcr.(6405)

Registry
No.

HFTS

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

2/6

Draft.

Letter to:

7. F.D. WEBBER.
W. J. M. G.
Colonial Office

From:

H.F.T.
Mr. Smith

RECEIVED IN DIVISION	
- 5 JUN 1961	
SENT TO BY	5/6
SIGNATURE	

+ 0

In a recent letter about the Sudanese refugees in Uganda, H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Khartoum has spoken of the undue delay with which he receives Saving telegrams from British territories in East Africa. He quotes as a particular example the Governor of Uganda's telegram No. 22 Saving to the Colonial Office of May 3, which did not reach Khartoum until May 16. ^{MP2} This conflict between the need for rapid communication and the need for economy is of course always with us, and we realise that the Governors, like us, must be sparing in ~~their~~ use of the telegraph. But there are occasions, and I think perhaps this is one of them, when a post ^{currently} needs to be kept/informed if it is to be able to cope with the enquiries of the Government to which it is accredited.

3. I think it would be helpful, therefore, if you could point out to the Governors concerned the need to consider whether a ^{W. J. M. G.} tel. which is being sent Saving to you should nevertheless be telegraphed to Khartoum. We, for our part, will of course act as a ^{long} ~~back~~stop, and if you would be good enough to ensure that any Saving tels. you receive that are also marked Saving for Khartoum could be passed to us quickly, we

/will

will consider whether they should be repeated
telegraphically through our channel.

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on jacket
CHL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(VS 1821/20)

June 5, 1961.

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3. I think it would be helpful, therefore, if you could point out to the Governors concerned the need to consider whether a telegram, which is being sent Saving to you should nevertheless be telegraphed to Khartoum. We, for our part, will of course act as a longstop, and if you would be good enough to ensure that any Saving telegrams you receive that are also marked Saving for Khartoum could be passed to us quickly, we will consider whether they should be repeated telegraphically through our channel.

(H.F.T. Smith)

F.D. Webber, Esq., C.M.G.,
Colonial Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

